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Cbapter? 
Tbe Significance oftbe Economic Summits 
Joseph P. Daniels I 
Marquette University and G8 Research Group, University of Toronto 
1. Introduction 
The protests that materialize at the economic summits and the expense of host-
ing a summit measured against actual policy outcomes call for a rethinking of 
the significance of the high-profile international gatherings such as the annual 
economic summits, and perhaps even the regular meetings of international in-
stitutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMP) and the World Bank. 1 
The tragic event') of September 11 and the Madrid bombings question the wis-
dom of hosting events that bring together the leaders of the wealthiest nations 
in one location. The current global governance framework is, after all, crowded 
with various summits. The principle consideration. therefore. is whether events 
such as the annual economic summits contribute enough to global poJicymak-
ing to warrant their continuation. 3 
Because the economic summits are unique. in that they bring together the 
leaders as opposed to ministers and bureaucrats, expectations for the meet-
ings to deliver ambitious agreements certainly run high. But arc the summits 
designed to deliver such agreements? Should the leaders attempt to deliver 
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l TIle summits are very expensive events. It is reported (Ibison 200 L) that the Okinawa summit 
cost the Japanese government approximately V81 billion ($650 million). Furthermore, it 
appears that some of these expenses were the results of misappropriation on the part of 
Japanese bureal.lCrals. 
At the time of the Genoa summit, editoriab offered by the leading media $howed opposing 
opinions on the significance and contributions of the economic summits. One editorial, for 
example, claimed (Nairn, 2001) that the summits are merely an "e~erdse in futility" that 
generates too few decisions. Yet another (Helms, 2001) maintained tbat the record of the 
summits is one of "sustained and substantial cooperation". 
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ambitious and detailed agreements, even if they could? Are there specific is-
sues that are more likely to be resolved in a summit fonnat as opposed to 
clsewhere? This chapt~ considers what the aRnual xummits were originally 
designed tu accomplish, economic policy cooperation. the rer..:ord of the sum-
mil accomplishmcnls. how the summits evolved, antIl.he role of the summits in 
the conlext of the global economic governance architecture. lbis is done in the 
(.'QDtexl of economic policymaking- Ihe summit's raison d 'bre-and, therefore. 
looks past other important accompli shments and shortcomings of tile summits. 
For example, this chapler does nO( consider the importance of the summits 
in addressing issues of global terrorism, WMO!>, and collective responses to 
North Korea and the Middle East (sa Kirton. 2003). Hence, rhe analysis here 
is very focused and, arguably, conti ned. 
The central thesis of this paper is thai the summits have contributed, though 
in a limited way, to intemational economic policy cooperation and the summit 
process is a significant organization in today's global governance architecture. 
Nonetheless, it is argued ncre that globa1 economic siability depend'i, I1rst and 
foremost, on good domestic economic policymaking. International policy co-
oper3lion. although ever more important in light of global economic integrn-
tion, is of second order importance for global stability. Given this view. and the 
record of what the summilS have and have nOI accomplished. the conclusion 
reached here is that the leaders should avoid international policy coordina-
rion package,; and focus on sbaring information. This position is similar, bill 
not as pessimistic as that of Rauen Sally (2001, p .S5) who slates that "most 
arguments for globaJ governance are in fact bad economics and even worse 
political economy", Hence. the media and other critical observers who look 
for the summits to deliver concrete and detailed policy packages must realize 
that less may be better when it comes to the economic summits. 
2_ Tbe Genesis of the Economic Summits 
The annual economic summils were bum out of the "Library Group", the in-
formal meetings of the finance ministers (later the 05 meetings of the finance 
ministers). TIte~ meetings began with an im-ilstion from George Shultz 10 
the finunce ministers of Gennany, France. and the U.K. to meet in the White 
House Library. At that time. President Valery Giscatd d'Eslaing and Chancel-
lor Helmut Schmidt participated in these meetings as finance ministers and felt 
these infonnal meeulI1!:s should continue with their remaining G.s counterpuM.s 
(Annsl!ong, (988). 
Three realities motivated the first summit, hosted and organized by Presi-
dent Giscard in 197:5. First there was the realization that some globaJ economic 
event.'l, such as the 1973 - 1974 oil shocks. lie beyond the individual contml of 
1 
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policymakers in the major industrialized economies. Second, was the increas-
ing integration of the advanced economies, and the number of common prob-
lems shared by policymakers. Third was the awareness that even in a flexible 
ext:hange rate regime, nations cannol conduct e{;onomic polit:y independent of 
one another. 
2.1 Purpose 
International economic policy cooperation was the formal purpose of the early 
summits. Note that the summit declarations themselves often do not distin-
guish between international policy cooperation and international policy coordi-
nation. To many economists, however. economic policy cooperation is the ex-
change of infonnation designed to prevent or minimize the adverse spillovers 
of economic policy actions thereby minimizing t:ommon harm. In t:ontrast, 
economic policy coordination denotes the activities that bring about significant 
changes in domestic policies in recognition of international interdependencies 
so as to maximize the common good (von Furstenberg and Daniels, 1992). Pol-
icy coordination, therefore, is something much more concrete and ambitious 
than policy cooperation. 
In addition to international economic policy cooperation. the summits were 
also intended to serve as a forum for the leaders to settle issues that their min-
isters were unable to resolve. In other words, the leaders would tackle the most 
difficult issues of the day. The legitimization of floating exchange rates at the 
first economic ~ummit is an example of an issue that had been eluding Ihe lead-
ers and ministers for a number of years. (The agreement actually came about 
on the eve of the summit as pressure mounted on U.S. and French deputies.) 
The resolution and completion of thc Uruguay round of trade negotiation is an-
other example of the summit participants taking on issues their ministers had 
been unable to resolve. 
2.2 Structure 
President Giscard envisioned the first summit as a one-time meeting of the 
leaders, although with hindsight it is clear that the Rambouillet summit would 
spark a full cycle of summit meetings. The early summit meetings were de-
signed to be exclusive and top down in structure. These two features remain to 
day. In spite of the addition of Canada and Russia, and frequent invitations to 
include the President of the European Union, the summit remains an exclusive, 
private club whose members are in complete control of the club's member-
ship. Keeping with the original top-down structure, the summits remain aloft 
of other organizations and do not act laterally with any other international in-
stitution. 
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It was also hoped that the summits would remain flexible and able to re-
spond to shared crises of the day. Once the summits .seuled 00 an annual 
timetable, some of this flexibility was lost The llbili lY of the summitS to re-
act timely to pre~~ing problems soon ~came a point of debate. For example, 
according to a souN ,herpa the Japanese delegation warned thei r counterpartS 
of an impending crisis in Thailand during the 1997 Denver surnrrul.· A preoc-
cup!ltion w ith "the U.S. economic model", a failed E.U. summit that took place 
immediately prior to the 07 summit, the obvious Jilek oCan agenda by the host 
country. and the unwiUingness of the Japanese to press the is:;ue. hOWt\'Cl, left 
the impending crisis otT the already crowded agenda. 
The 1998 Birmingham summit was also conspicuously mute on the 1997 
linancial crisis.. AI this summit. both !he mainstream media and the Summit 
participants were focused on other current non-ecooomic iSSue5. The U.S. me-
dia were most interested in an unfolding domestic crisis for the U.S. Presidenl 
as delai ls of a dal liance wilh an inlern were unfolding 81 home. Perhaps, this 
was the rea.~ fOf" U.S. officials to hold press conferences at a hotel near the 
airport a." opposed to the central-city media facility where all otner press con-
ferences were hekl. 1be olber issue of the day was the detonation of a nuclear 
device by India. Though the U.S. pre.'I~ for a multilateral response to lndia '~ 
actions, a policy action consensus could not be reached (due mostly to a yel 
unused G lenn Amendment that automatically triggered U.S. unilateral sarn;. 
lions). ~ 
In spite of the summits becoming sornedling of a pseudo-institution. they 
sti ll remain Illort independent, eJevnted. and flexible 11mn other international 
organizations. Because of these characteristics. the sum mit can be seen as n 
policy conCf!rt: a non-institutiun thaI relies on a small number of ru ie.'I. A poli(.'Y 
cuncen serves mainly to cooperate in policy formation rather than follow ruI~ 
established 10 manage international relations (Kirton, 1989 and Schwegmann. 
2002). It is Ihi~ chruucteristic that is lht: strong point and distinctiveoe!lS of the 
annual summits. 
A ~hcrpa is the pclVlMl ,~pce$mul!ive or !he leader and !he lem'1 COII'Iel fTom the native 
bearn$ .... 110 as5ist mt.IIIOtairo cl imbers in die Himalayas Uujltill . 1989). The penonaJ rqwe. 
senwiva of the finam:e and fom gn minlstCTS are ~ferred to as 1oO\Is-sherp:a5. 
TItc:: Glenn amelldl1lenl requires automatic uno;tiun~ again~l l nation detonatinJ "nuclear 
device. a11owiro, lite PresJdent but • few dftys \(l iIMJke the u !lCtlons unibtternl1y or pre· 
&endng n ea.e against said 5anctlont; to Con~~~. With his hand, lied by the ame~nc, 
Pre.5ident Clinton hd linle room 10 ~ his eounterparu 10 ;nin in a ooattinatt'd piItl.. 
age of EaIX:lion~. 
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3. The Record or the Summit~ 
In ~pite of the fact thlilihe origim summit was envisioned as a " fire-side chat". 
the globul media and other interested summit watchers cominue 10 e.x.pe<:1 the 
]cflders to do much more thanjust exchange views. The t:ommunique. the pub-
lit: document generated by the swnmit process, is continuously scrutinized for 
signs of quantitative policy commitmenll>. Summit watchers e~1 the sum-
rruls to delh'er inlernational policy coordination packages as opposed to merely 
facilitating pulil")' l,,'OOpCration. In spite of this pressure. acrual examples of in-
ternational policy coordination are not so easy to find. 
3. I Exampks of Policy CuuntinatiOIl During the 19705 and 19805 
Many C(.'tmomists regard the 1978 Bonn Summit as the hallm.'U"k of policy 
coordinatioo. At this summit, the leaders committed to a policy package where 
(he economies of Gennany and Japan were to be stimulated through 6scal 
measures, thereby spurring economic growth lhroughout the G7 economies -
a locomotive effect. The other G7 nations, the United Slates in particular, were 
to contain infllltionary pressures. A tripling of crude oil prices by OPEC the 
following June halted efforts to complete the package of policy measures. This 
pol;cy package was later criticized.. especially in Gennany, for mt:rely adding 
to inflationary pressu!ts. 
Some economists. in contrast. argue that the Ims summit is not a true e.x-
ample of international policy coordination. Their claim is that the 1978 agree-
mem docs not represent an adjusunent of poli~ies that would not hove other-
wise been undertaken without any such agreement to coordinale (Theuringer, 
2001). Because the policy measures were likely 10 be undenaken unilaterally. 
it is nOi. an effort to bring about signifi cant change. . in domestic policies due to 
international linkages and the promotion of imemational common good. 
The Plaza-Louvre period of the last half of the 1980s is sometimes offered 
as another example of international policy coordination. During this period. 
tile advanced economy nations engaged in substantial and cOOf"djnat.ed foreign 
exchange iolerventions desigJIed 10 bring down the value of the doUar. The-5e 
inlerventions. however, were Slerili"l.ed.· Hence. there was an unwillingness 
to allow these coonlimll.ed foreign exchange interventions to affect domestic 
ecooom.ies. In addition. the view among academic economists is that steril-
ized foreign exchange intervention was effective in the short run only. or at 
best. Indeed this view found its way into the Jurgenson Repon of 1993. which 
was commissioned by the leaders at the Versailles Summit in 1982 (Sarno 
Sleriliutioo is the proce~ of ulKlerta.lcing IUl lIddit;onal portfolio opetatioo. r;ud! lIS wyin& 
or sellin& &oYerrunent irl$tJ\tJnrol5 OJ" third curn:ncies. w lh:n the domestic IUOOCIlII'Y base i5 
unaffec1ed by the forcign exchange lfIIQStIdloD. 
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and Taylor. 200 1). Being unwilling to subordinate domestic economic (Xllicy 
to achieve an international and shared ohjective, this era, therefore, does not 
represent policy coonlinatioo either. 
3.2 The Empirical Evidence 
Empirical examinations of thelirst two rounds of the annual summits fwther 
show that pol6cymakers were either unwilling or unabk to Mfill coooomtc: pol-
icy commitments agreed upon and put forward in the summit communiques. 
Von Furstenberg and Daniels (1992) develop n mcu-ic for gauging the degree 
of compliance on JXllicy commitments fonned al the summits. Using empiri-
cal evidence on outcomes, their resenrch indicates that policymakers delivered 
on ahoul one-third of thei.r economic policy commitments. The summ.il", for 
example, receiv~ relatively poor scores on commitments to stabilize exchange 
rates and relatively higher scores on trade and energy corwnitmeots. The con-
clusion they reach is that policymakm;; are better at delivering on miCroo..'tl-
nomic commitmenls mther than macroeconomic ones. 
The summit communiques not only reveal !he policy undenakings them-
selves, they also provide glimpses of what the undenakings promise to achieve. 
In this way. some of the general economic relationships and means-ends link· 
ager. that policyrnakcrs subscribe 10 also f,:nrne (0 light. As RIchard Cooper 
(1985) points out, even ifpolicymakers have compatible objectives and simi· 
lar economic coooitions. they may disagree on lbcir forecasts of fUUlre events 
and the structure of economies and therefore 00 the relationship of means to 
ends. 
There are very few empirical studies of the means-ends relationship ad-
vanced in the economic declarations. Daniels (1993) inventories the relatioo-
forupS found in the fi rst fifteen summit dedarntions. This s rudy finds thal most 
of the ec<lnomic relationships, or understandings, can be characterized as ar-
guable. That is, the mellils·ends relatiooship found in the communique can nei-
ther be rejected by the empirical evidence nor supp:med in a slltlistica1 sense. 
On the one hand, the conclusion that policymakers generally do not conunit 
themselves to undertaking. .. based on economic assumptions that nre vCJy risky 
or run the chance that they mlly he rejected outright by future empirical study 
is not too remarkahle. On the other hand, it is a bit surprising that policyrnakers 
do not completely "play it safe" and rely oruy on economic relationships that 
are beyond dispute. 
Of course the first of these s tudies focuses on quantitati"e commitments 
to achieve some economic outcome and, therefore. are primarily examples of 
policy coordination. The second, however, examines the framework in which 
these commitments "''eI'e made and can be ~cn m~ so as a measure of ceo-
1 , 
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nomic policy cooperation. Because of the low score on policy undertakings 
and the relatively neutral grade on means-ends relationships, one must con-
clude that the summits should primarily serve to cooperate rather than coordi-
nate. Furthennore, policy cooperation must take precedence over policy coor-
dination. After all, the leaders must first come to agreement on their economic 
assessments, forecasl~, and economic ideology before subscribing to poli<:y 
undertakings intended to achieve some specific objective. 
The evidence cited above shows why there is considerable opposition to in-
ternational economic policy coordination, especially among Gennan and U.S. 
economists, but support for grealcr policy cooperation. Clearly another reason 
for this resistance is the recognition that poJicymakers face a "technological 
constraint" (Blackburn and Christenson 1989), that is, there is a limit to what 
economists know and on the quaJity of their advice and forecasts. Another rea-
son is that it has been shown (for example, Frankel and Rockett 1988) that 
coordination based on incorrect infonnation or models can actually be coun-
terproductive. Finally, if Gennan and U.S. finance ministers were to coordinate 
on foreign exchange rates, thereby committing Iheir central banks to monetary 
policy actions, this could compromise the autonomy of their central banks and 
jeopardize their hard fought stocks of central bank credibility. 
More recently there have been some examples of policy coordination 
(though these policy packages have yet to be fully recognized.) The firsl ex-
ample is the refonn of the international financial urchitecture and the second 
is multilateral initiative on debt relief for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) a.~ reinforced by the Cologne initiative of 1999. It is quite possible, 
in the very near future, that we will count the financial fight against terrorism 
as the fruit of improvements in internationally coordinated efforts to combat 
transnational crime. 
3.3 Uneven Success 
Whether or not the above examples are "true" examples of international policy 
coordination, there is little doubt that the perfonnancc of the economic sum-
mits as a global governance body is uneven. Even though the summiteers may 
have a view from the highest perspective possible, they are certainly no better 
at predicting crises than lower-level participants. 
Two recent examples of economic poliey cooperation failures are the in-
ability to collectively recognize an impending collapse of an inflated Japanese 
economy and, as mentioned earlier, the sununit participants refusal to hecd 
Japan's warning of a possible crisis in Thailand in the spring of 1997. An 
example of policy coordination failures is that incapacity to pass a multilat-
eral agreement on investment (in spite of the fact that investment flows con-
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tinue to i~ at rates much greater than those seen in gtobal trade.) 10 re-
gard to trade. the summits have demonstrdted the ability to gencr:ue critical 
multilateral decision-making. m a ''RambouiUet effect", ~sulUng in marginal 
progress during periods of mu1ti'al~ml negotiations (Ullrich. 2(04), Nonethe-
less, the summits failed to dampen rising regionalis.m. aoo., particularly during 
the ClintOf] administration. made little or 00 progress in expanding tra.d~ on a 
multilateral basis need to provide better lendership, especially when mullilll!-
era! negotiarions stal l. 
Why. then, are the summits 5uooe!>Sful in some areas, hut nol others' Some 
policymakers and xadcmks agree mat perhaps the best single explanation 
of the uneven success of the summits ties in the CODlpete:nce of the ministty 
responsible for implementing the specific undertaking agreed to by the leaders 
(Kokotsis. 1999). lbose intimately involved see the finance ministers' policy 
process as the most developed and displaying the most coordination and follow 
through. with the foreign ministers being second in this regard. In addition, lbe 
fordgn flrinister.> have Well-elil3blisOOd links to insti tutions such as !he Paris 
Club, the L\{f', and the World Batik. 
4. The MarginaJizing of Economics 
The 1978 Bonn Sumflril re~sents a turning point for the ecooornic summits. 
At the end of this surrunit, the leaden issued a joint statement on hijacking. 
This statement shows thot the summit agenda, for the fiTSt time, included is-
sues other than global economics and marks the gradual margirutJizing of «:0-
nomics. as economic iJO.~ ues receive less and less attention with each round of 
sumntiu. 
By the early 1990s. CCOfl()mic issues received limited space on the sununit 
a~nda. Excepl. f(K the Cologne sununit, global ecOflomic policy continues to 
receive less attention III the summits despite calls by policymakers such as Gor-
don Brown, U.K.. finance minister, to "put economics back into the summit". 
This murginal..iz.ing of economics is al!iO due in pan to tile inclusion of Rus-
sia ~ a near-full participant in 1997 and member in 1998. Russia was, and still 
is economically asymmetric to the other 07 members. Its inclusion. therefore, 
reflects the aim to use the economic swnm its to achieve political objectives, 
as opposed 10 economic ones. Th~ inclusion of Russia may also signal another 
imponant change in the summits for the near future: the inclusion of China 
as a member and the move to a 09. If China continues to move forward with 
refonns and panicipatcs in a greater number of imponam institutions (e.g., per-
manent member of lhe United Nations Security Council, member of the G20. 
and member of the World Trade Organization), it increases this possibility. 
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Some observers c laim tlwl the conversion 10 lhe Eum may spark a change 
in the G& process as well. 1be urgumt:lll is that lhere will be a fewer number uf 
G8 nations with independerll monetruy policy. Hence. the summit may evolve 
to a triad-plus-Russia organization, thm is North America. Europe and Japan 
plus Russia. This is unlikely, however, a. .. mum::UU)' policy has never been pan. 
of the economic summits in the firM plllcc. 
5. The Significance or the Economic Summits in Today's Global 
Governance Architecture 
The introduction 10 this paper stressed Ibal. it is good domestic economic pol-
icymaking thaI is critical '0 global economic stability. Cood domestic eco-
nomic policymaldng spurs economic growth. creates an enviroruncl\I to pro-
mote financial stability. and reduces thc gap between those who have and those 
who have not. 'The annual economic summits, therefore, can only promote 
global economic stability by improving upon domestic economic policy mak-
ing through inteTrultional economic policy cooperation. 
5.1 Cooperate, not Coordiuate 
If global economic stability is improved, first and foremost. througb good do-
mestic poticymaking. then Iberc is no instilution. even the summil ... thai serves 
as the ultimate centre for gloOOl economic governance. This is a vcry specific 
claim. however. as it fcx:uses on ecooomic issues only. It nl3y well be thai 
the swnmiu an: at the cenlte or global governance, which encompa.~ much 
more than economic issues. N~less. the summits should be ~n first and 
foremost as a means for improving and generlltiIlg better domestic policies as 
opposed to delivering pat:kages of coordinated policies designed to enhance 
colk:ctive or joint welfare. 
{)(her than testing meao!>-c:mJs relationships thai might he found in the dec-
lamlions. the effects of inlmllllKJnal policy cooperalion - !>haring information 
and ideas - cannoc be measured . Whal is unp3.1o.table about this po."ilioo 10 Ihe 
media and academic observers of the summit process (this author included) 
is thai it means that we cannol quantitatively evalua te lhe Significance of the 
summit process. Hence. we cannot argue with any r igor, that the swnmits ac· 
complished anything or not. We can evaluate qualitatively the achievements of 
the summit~, asse~8ing the appropriateness of W3S discussed (Which is done 
wmually by the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronlo and posted on 
Ibe G8 Website at www.g7.utoronto.ca.) 
Sharing of infonnatioo intemationaUy, however. can do much to improve 
domestic economic policym!lk..ing. Certainly Ihe summits are uniquely suited 
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to international policy cooperation. Having the highest view, the leaden must 
surely ~ f3rthe:r than miniSters and bureaucrats. Hence, when the leaders of 
the G8 C~ together and discuss economics conditions it must be wonh more 
than just idle talk. By reaching understandings, as opposed 10 agreements or 
undertakings. the summits are well prepared to set broad visions and aid in 
domestic economic policymaking. 
5.2 Improving the Process 
Now that some limits have ~n imposed on what the summits can reasonably 
deliver in tenns of economic policymaking, what do !his mean for the summit 
process itseln In order to build and maintain the credibility of the process, 
the G8 should not set themselves up as a "Super Cabinet" or direcmire for 
global go\'emance (Hodges, 1994), and in spite of pressure by the media for the 
summits to produce bard agreements and detailed solutions to world problems. 
the leaders must avoid giving the impression that they are capable of dealing 
with all issue·s and solving all crises. 
In spite of this limitation, the summits provide the best "bully pulpit" to 
advance perspectives on globalization. This is, arguably, their most important 
responsibility, because international trade and engagemem in the global mar-
ketplace is stil l seen by a majority of people in the advanced nations as a zero-
sum game. There is no better forum that couJd be used to articulaJe the: benefits 
to a nation's res idents from participating in the global marketplace. And yet, 
this opportunity remains to be fully utilized. 
Of course the summil process can be improved upon and there are a num-
ber of ~Is on how to do so (~ Hodges. Kinon, and Daniels, 1999). In 
lemlS of globaJ e(XJllOrWC policy, and in light of we evidence and views given 
hereio, the summit prooess could be improved by: 
I . Streamlining the procc:Sli along the lines recommemkd by John Major in 
1992. 
2. Removing from the agenda any domestic economic issues 00{ fully inter-
nationalized. Or, in other words, remove those issues that do not h.old the 
possibil ity of assembling international synergies. 
3. Focu!ling on i!>!>ues whose means-ends relationships are well understood so 
that ministers can see th~ to fruitiOll. 
4. Worlting for agreements in areas where leaders have real authority, For ex-
ample, monetary policy should continue to be off the table since the leaders 
do n01 hold any authority in this area. 
5. Working for agreements in areas where credible and effective dome~lic in· 
stitutions exist 
6. Continuing 10 communicllte well with ministers. 
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7. Avoid givinS the imprcssjon thai the summits ClUJ solve every problem, or 
"lower expectations, L"OOllht lernpe:r.nure and even try to ignore the head~ 
of stille" (Hodges. 1999. p. 72). 
Given tbis menu for improvemem. what are !he issues that should be ad-
dressed at the summits? The moSt obvious would be 10 revive the Irtalled Doha 
Trade Round Another issue that also has impertalll humanitarian implications 
fOf developing nations is to continue multilateral debt rel ief without substitut-
ing it for eominued development a.o;.sistaDCe. 
6. Conclusion 
II is argued bere tM! the summits should not be trnn~fonned or elevated to 
SOlne system of global ceO/lomie governance. Rather. global economic ~­
bitity dcpends on good domestic economic policymaking and, lbcrefo~. the 
I:conomic sununit~ canOOI substitute for effective and effi cient policy making 
within sovereign nations. The swwnits. therefore. ~hould be seen first and 
foremost as a means for impro .... ing and generating better domestic poti£ie.r 
via cooperation as opposed to delivering packuge~ of c:oordin:tled policies. By 
focusing on international economic policy cooperation. the summits can con-
lribute much to improvi ng domestic ~'Onomic policy making. 
The prote:>! 3t the Geooll summit and the even[S of September 11 provide a 
well-timed opportunity 10 re thinltthe formal of the li'ummi[S.lo stream1ine t~ 
process. and 10 return 10 the European or RambouiUet model of summitry. Per-
h:i.ps this is the path the summits are on fo llowing the "secluded and intimate" 
2002 summit in Kananaskis (Bayne. 20(2). 
The world was I very uncertain place in 1975. There wen: oil shocks, an 
unsenlcd fureign-cxchange system. and 11 global recession. TIle original sum-
mit was formed to deal with these unc:el1ainties. lbe world is again an uncer-
tain place. with financial crises. me emergence of Russia and China as polit-
ical and economic fun:es, terrorist auacks on the UnilOO States. an economic 
downturn among the advanced economies, and turbulence in the world's eq-
uit)' markets. The annual summits remain ltS 3 significant forum for sharing 
information and reducing this uncertainty. 
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